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In a 1908 article entitled “The Pragmatist Account of Truth and Its Misunderstanders”, William James 
proposed the following thought experiment: 
I thought of what I called an ‘automatic sweetheart,’ meaning a soulless body which should be absolutely indistinguish-
able from a spiritually animated maiden […] Would any one regard her as a full equivalent? Certainly not, and why? 
Because, framed as we are, our egoism craves above all things inward sympathy and recognition, love and admiration. The 
outward treatment is valued mainly as an expression, as a manifestation of the accompanying consciousness believed in.2 
The experiment shows that when interacting with another person we are not satisfied with them looking like 
a person: we want them to really be a person. However, there is a category of objects with which we normally 
interact being content with the fact that they resemble people, though clearly not being such. These objects 
are works of art.
The theory of the work of art as an “automatic sweetheart”3 aims to treat the work of art as a social object 
while preserving its aesthetic peculiarities. These two complementary objectives are pursued through the 
articulation of two concepts: one begins by defining a social object as a social act (i.e. involving at least two 
agents) that is inscribed (i.e. recorded on a tangible medium, or simply in people’s minds); then the final step 
is to define a work of art as a social object that has a peculiar property – being an automatic sweetheart, that 
is, an object pretending to be a subject, a thing pretending to be a person. The (at least two) people involved in 
the social act, in this case, are the artist and the appreciator. The structure of the automatic sweetheart clarifies 
the relationship between these two agents: the artist creates the automatic sweetheart as if it were a person and 
the appreciator experiences it as if it were a person.
*
The obvious objection that a film or a symphony don’t look at all like a person allows us to make a decisive 
clarification. The theory does not state that works of art should look like people in the sense of being anthro-
pomorphic. The idea is rather that usually people are the main sources of mental attitudes – such as emotions 
and feelings – that are also aroused by works of art.
Also, a work of art pretends to be a person in the sense that it appears to be equipped with its own individuality; 
the work is presented as an individual to which we are inclined to attribute not only material properties 
(small, colored...) but also mental ones (intelligent, brilliant, melancholic, passionate). According to Peter F. 
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Strawson, people are the paradigmatic case of entities that we can describe using both predicates designating 
material properties (M-predicates) and predicates designating personal or mental properties (P-predicates).4 
Arthur C. Danto shows that a similar duality of predicates is also found in the case of works of art:
The relationship between the work and its material substrate is as intricate as that between mind and body. Or, following 
P. F. Strawson, with his distinction between P-predicates and M-predicates, it is as if there were properties of the work 
exemplifying what we may call W-predicates and properties of the mere things that are visually indiscernible from the 
work, exemplifying what we may call O-predicates, where there is the task, which may vary from item to item in an ar-
rayed example, of determining which O-predicates are also W-predicates and which are not. […] The distinction between 
artworks and mere real things reappears as a distinction between the language used to describe works and the language 
of mere things.5 
We argue that to appreciate a work of art means to interact with an individual that could be called a quasi-per-
son, or an automatic sweetheart: though it has only material properties, it appears to us as if it also had mental 
properties. Moreover, like people, works of art often have a name (their title) and a date of birth (the time of 
their creation). Strawson himself, in his only essay on aesthetics (1966), highlights the unique “individuality 
of the work of art”, which distinguishes it from other families of objects.6 To this end, Strawson endorses the 
claims of two “writers on aesthetics”: Stuart Hampshire, for whom “‘[The] purpose [of the critic] is to lead 
people to look at precisely this unique object, not to see the object as one of a kind, but as individual and un-
repeatable”; and Margaret Macdonald, for whom “Every work of art is unique and in the last resort, perhaps, 
can be judged by no standard but its own”.7 
*
However, some art appreciators are not satisfied with the works of art being like people; they want them to 
really be people. To achieve this aim, the work of art must be provided with extra soul, which is the soul of 
its author. In so doing, not only does the work of art seem like a person, but it is a person, in the sense that it 
becomes inseparable from the author who created it, from whom the work thus receives a supplement of soul.
The cult of the author in the appreciation of art (for instance, the so-called politique des auteurs in cinema), 
seems to respond precisely to this dissatisfaction with the artwork being like a person – it is required to be a 
person instead. However this attitude towards art is likely to have a misleading effect on aesthetic apprecia-
tion. The problem is that, according to the author’s cult, the value attributed to a work no longer depends on 
what makes it such – its ability to be like a person – and is instead made to depend on its being a person, that 
is, its being at one with the author who created it.
In fact, the principle that anything can be a work of art – one of the fundamental principles of contemporary 
art, ever since Duchamp – has as its indispensable corollary the intentional act of an author who gives the ordi-
nary object an extra soul. A more prosaic way of formulating this fundamental principle lies in the injunction: 
“read the catalog”. If the work does not speak to you, it’s not its fault (it is not that it fails to be like a person, 
to function as an automatic sweetheart): the fault is yours because you do not understand (you, the viewer, 
cannot grasp the soul that gives it life, the soul of the artist). Reading the catalog is a way to learn to recognize 
the soul that the artist has breathed into the work.
*
The theory of the automatic sweetheart is opposed to this way to approach art, which mainly applies to contem-
porary art but is also widely present in more popular arts such as cinema, especially in the cultural phenomenon 
known as cinephilia. What is being asked of a work of art as an automatic sweetheart is primarily to function in 
itself, on its own, arousing emotions and thoughts regardless of the knowledge that the viewer might have about 
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the author of the work. In ordinary experience, we meet people and we appreciate and judge them for how 
they behave, not for their noble birth; similarly, in artistic experience, we meet a work of art, i.e. an automatic 
sweetheart, and we appreciate and judge it for how it works, that is, for how it seems to behave.
The theory of the automatic sweetheart, in this respect, points out the possibility of a direct relationship with 
works of art, rather than mediated by the personality of the author. Here is the link with the idea of A History 
of Cinema Without Names: “nameless”, here, means above all “authorless”. The primary interest is no longer 
given to the wires that move the puppet, and even less to the hand that pulls the wires; attention turns instead 
to the puppet itself, or the automatic sweetheart, regardless of the wires and hands that move it.
*
At this point, one should note that the theory of the automatic sweetheart is admittedly an incomplete theory 
of art. An automatic sweetheart is only a sufficient condition, not a necessary condition, to be a work of art. 
Namely, all works of art are automatic sweethearts, but there are also things that are automatic sweethearts 
without being works of art; for example, dolls, posters, Christmas trees, a security blanket, Winnicott’s trans-
actional objects, Christopher Lambert’s speaking keychain in Marco Ferreri’s I love you (1986).8 
The necessary condition that distinguishes works of art from other automatic sweethearts is to be found 
precisely in the importance of information on the history of the work’s creation, in order to achieve an ap-
propriate appreciation of the work itself. If one wants to properly appreciate and evaluate a work of art, one 
should not just treat it as if it were a person, but one must also know which real person has made it – in which 
historical context, within which cultural practice. The primary motivations that underlie the author’s cult are 
not, therefore, totally unfounded; indeed, they individuate the additional component that allows one to nar-
row down the works of art within the wider set of automatic sweethearts.
*
The plurality of components of the artwork has been analyzed by Richard Wollheim in the specific case of 
pictures. Wollheim distinguishes three different levels of appreciation in the experience of a picture: 1) the 
“Recognitional Fold”, which deals with recognizable scenes in the picture; 2) the “Configurational Fold”, 
which concerns the material vehicle of the picture and the distribution of colored marks on its surface; 3) The 
“Standard of Correctness” which regards the history of the picture’s making and the intentions of the artist 
who created it. 9 
The Configurational Fold is the joint that connects the Recognitional Fold to the Standard of Correctness: from 
the experience of the scenes depicted by an picture (Recognitional Fold), we can go back to the recognition of 
the author’s intentions (Standard of Correctness) by means of the perceptual experience of the picture’s surface 
as an object configured by the author (Configurational Fold). This is because the artist, according to his inten-
tions (Standard of Correctness), configured the perceptible picture area (Configurational Fold) by which we 
recognize the depicted scenes (Recognitional Fold). Starting from this characterization, Wollheim argues that 
the proper appreciation of the picture consists in retracing the process of its creation; in this regard, he speaks 
of “criticism as retrieval”, stating that “the task of criticism is the reconstruction of the creative process”.10 
*
Taking Wollheim’s “criticism as retrieval” to its extreme consequences, the cult of the author focuses on 
the Standard of Correctness (what the artist “meant”) treating the Configurational Fold (the experience of 
what the artist made) as the main object of attention, while relegating the Recognitional Fold (the experience 
36
Automatic Sweethearts Without Names
produced by the artwork itself) to a secondary role. The cult of the author, therefore, has the limit of under-
estimating the importance of the Recognitional Fold, placing too much emphasis on the Configurational Fold 
and on the Standards of Correctness. 
Yet, as Wollheim himself makes very clear, the Standard of Correctness is an essential component of the pic-
ture: the cult of the author, to a certain extent, has a raison d’être. The work of art is an automatic sweetheart 
of which we also want to know the history of creation; a puppet of which we also want to see the wires, and 
even the puppeteer that moves them.
But the fact remains that the appreciation of the work of art as an automatic sweetheart, as a seemingly au-
tonomous puppet, is a crucial moment of the aesthetic experience. And it is this aesthetic moment that is likely 
to be overshadowed by a conception of art focused on the author. There is a direct relationship with the work 
as an apparently autonomous individual, as an automatic sweetheart, which is preliminary to any appreciation 
of the work seen as the creation of a real person – the author, the artist. One should treat the work as if it were 
self-generated, and as if it were able to generate a number of experiences on its own: this is the main precept 
that follows from the theory of the work of art as an automatic sweetheart. In the particular case of cinema, 
this amounts to treating a film as a peculiar entity providing us with an experiential route through an objective 
world: namely, the world of the story being told. 
In this sense, the account of the film as an automatic sweetheart sharply differs from two important tendencies 
in the contemporary debate about cinema, namely, intentionalism and illusionism. According to intentional-
ism, recognizing the intentions of the filmmaker (either the real one, just as in cult of the author, or at least 
an implicit one) plays a fundamental role in our experience of films. According to illusionism, instead, our 
experience of fiction films has strong analogies with our embodied experience of the real world. On the one 
hand, intentionalism mainly draws on Gricean theories of communication11 and on language-based cognitive 
science.12 On the other hand, illusionism mainly draws on perception-based cognitive science13 and on neuro-
science.14 Borrowing Wollheim’s terminology, the focus on intentionalism is on the Configurational Fold and 
(through the”retrieval process”) on the Standard of Correctness, whereas the focus of illusionism is on the 
Recognitional Fold understood as providing the spectator with an embodied perceptual access to the world 
depicted by the film, as if she had her own place in this very world. 
Our account sharply differs from intentionalism since we understand the film as an object that, at a basic level 
of appreciation, can be enjoyed as a generator of experiences, namely an automatic sweetheart, without the 
need to recognize the filmmaker’s intentions. The recognition of intentions (through the Configurational Fold 
and the Standard of Correctnes) allows us to add layers of appreciation and to enrich our experience of a film, 
but such an enrichment relies on a basic layer of appreciation in which we just treat the film as an automatic 
sweetheart independently of the filmmaker’s intentions. 
Still, our account also differs from illusionism since we do not treat the film as eliciting an embodied percep-
tual experience of the world depicted that is of the same kind as the ordinary perception of the actual world. 
Rather, according to our account, the spectator’s experience basically concerns the film itself as an automatic 
sweetheart that supplies a sui generis disembodied perceptual experience of the world depicted. The film as 
an automatic sweetheart offers us a perceptual gift that is not normally available in our everyday experience. 
As explained, treating the film as an automatic sweetheart does not prevent one from being also interested in the 
author and the context of production. The two dimensions of appreciation are complementary. First one appreciates 
the work as automatic sweetheart, then you look into the wires and invisible hands moving her, and finally you go 
back to treating her as if she were alive: aesthetic judgment is formed in this coming and going. Treating the work as 
an automatic sweetheart does not exhaust its appreciation, but is an indispensable key stage of the process. 
*
In cultural practices there is often a gap between two typical forms of appreciation: that “of the masses”, 
which treat works primarily as automatic sweethearts, and that “of the experts”, who treat the works as 
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historical products of the artists who authored them. The point is that both of these modes of apprecia-
tion are limited. Therefore, the theory of the automatic sweetheart should not be confused with a revalu-
ation of the mass-spectator understood as a noble savage that is not affected by cultural prejudices. On 
the other hand, the theory of the automatic sweetheart is also opposed to idealizing expert knowledge as 
a paradigm of the attitude that everyone should have towards artworks. More modestly, the theory of the 
automatic sweetheart tries to show that both these dimensions – the naiveté of the masses, the knowledge 
of the experts – play a key role in the appreciation of a work of art, as they both establish the identity of 
the work itself.
The ability to pretend to be a person identifies the ontological genus of works of art: that of automatic sweet-
hearts. The essential link to the history of production and the author’s creative activity identifies the specific 
difference of the artwork in relation to other automatic sweethearts. Therefore it is appropriate to treat a work 
of art as an automatic sweetheart because of the genus to which it belongs, but it is equally appropriate to take 
interest in the history of creation of the work because of its specific difference.
*
While both these aspects – automatic sweetheart and artist’s creation – are essential to the understanding of 
the work of art, we believe that in this historic phase the first aspect is usually underestimated compared to 
the second. This is what motivates us to interpret the project of A History of Cinema Without Names in terms 
of a history of films understood as automatic sweethearts.
Filmmaking and contemporary art have established themselves around the same period, roughly a century 
ago: Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation dates 1915, and Duchamp’s Fountain 1917. Yet their working mechanism 
seems profoundly different. The more filmmaking highlights the work as an automatic sweetheart, the more 
contemporary art enhances the work as the artist’s emanation. Duchamp shows that any object can be a work 
of art, even a latrine, as long as the artist applies his signature, his name, to it. Griffith instead gives its audi-
ence a film as such capable of generating emotions, by virtue of the sheer force of its pictures, regardless of 
the author’s name.
*
On closer inspection, however, the divide is not as clear as we have presented it so far. A film is also the result 
of the creative acts of an author, and a work of contemporary art is also an automatic sweetheart. In particular, 
having now acquired legitimacy as an art form and not just as a form of entertainment, cinema recognizes 
directors as authors of films, and information about how a film was made imposes itself as an essential require-
ment for a proper appreciation of that film.
However, cinema has an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the traditional fine arts and their designated heir, con-
temporary art. This inferiority complex seems due to what Benjamin defines “aura”.15 In the theoretical per-
spective of the automatic sweetheart we interpret the aura as the extra soul that the artist gives the work. The 
aura is to the artwork what the soul is to the body. That is, a work of art furnished with aura does not count 
as the disappointing automatic sweetheart of James’s thought experiment; instead it counts as a real person.
That being the case, the loss of aura that characterizes cinema is not just about technical reproducibility, but 
especially about the ability to produce works – films – that may also function as automatic sweethearts, freed 
from the need of a supplement of soul, of an aura. On the other hand contemporary art brings the idea of an 
aura to its extreme consequences, emphasizing the ability of artistic creation to transfigure the most miserable 
objects – Duchamp’s latrine, Manzoni’s faeces – by infusing aura into them.
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*
In a thought experiment concerning the nature of the work of art, Arthur Danto proposes to consider a 
curious character, unwilling to treat certain objects displayed in contemporary art museums as works of art: 
“Imagine, now, a certain Testadura – a plain speaker and noted philistine – who is not aware that these are art, 
and who takes them to be reality simple and pure”.16 
Danto’s point is that Testadura lacks a proper theory of art, so he merely focuses on the observable properties 
of the works, without recognizing the hidden, unobservable ones: those related to the history of the work’s 
creation, or to what we have defined as its aura – the extra soul that the artist has given it. At the contemporary 
art museum, Testadura only sees what is before him, failing to understand that it is a work of art and not an 
ordinary object. Seeing the beds exposed by Rauschenberg or Oldenburg, Testadura is tempted to lie down 
on them, and one can easily guess what would have occurred had he seen Duchamp’s Fountain. Yet Testadura 
would not have such problems if he went to a theater to watch a movie. This is because films present them-
selves as automatic sweethearts, and can be enjoyed without the need to grasp their aura. 
*
This difference between filmmaking and contemporary art can be synthesized by means of a historical narra-
tive. Until the nineteenth century, art appeared as a unitary phenomenon, such that the perceived appearance 
of the work and information about the history of its creation – in short, the automatic sweetheart on one side 
and the aura on the other – equally contributed to its appreciation. In the twentieth century, with the rise of 
cinema (and more generally of mass art)17 and readymade art (and more generally of contemporary art), the 
unity of the artistic phenomenon split. On the one hand, cinema appears to be capable of offering automatic 
sweethearts without aura. On the other, contemporary art offers items, such as readymades, which are unable 
to function on their own as automatic sweethearts, and therefore require additional knowledge on the history 
of their creation, that is, the soul that the artist has breathed into them – the aura.
Until the nineteenth century, despite his limitations, Testadura could appreciate the works of art without any 
particular difficulty, and distinguish them from ordinary objects that clearly are not works of art. At most one 
could object to Testadura that his appreciation wasn’t very deep, limited to observable qualities without tak-
ing into account the history of the work’s creation; however, it could not be denied that Testadura’s attitude 
towards the work of art was a genuine aesthetic appreciation. In the twentieth century, though, the art world 
was split in two: on one side the movie theater that seems made for Testadura, on the other the contemporary 
art museum where Testadura gets lost in awkward misunderstanding.
It is noteworthy that the status of “work of art” has often been challenged both in the case of filmmaking and 
in that of readymade art, but for different reasons. In the case of films, the problem is the lack of aura; in the 
case of readymade art, the problem is that there is nothing but the aura. Simmetrically, one could say that in 
the case of readymade art the problem is that the automatic sweetheart seems to be missing, while in the case 
of films it seems to be all there is. In short, the film pleases Testadura too much to be a work of art, while the 
readymades don’t please him enough.
In this paper we have tried to show that Testadura is not entirely in the wrong. There is a crucial dimen-
sion of aesthetic appreciation that is based on Testadura’s naivety, and that means treating the work of art as 
something that looks like a person, as a generator of experiences, emotions and feelings – like an automatic 
sweetheart. In filmmaking this dimension is particularly prominent. A History of Cinema without Names can 
finally give it the importance it deserves.
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